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RESPONSE TO DICKER 
William L. Rowe 
Among the things I wanted to achieve when I wrote the essay that Professor 
Dicker has discussed were these two. First, I wanted to layout Anselm's argument 
in step-by-step fashion staying very close to his formulation of it. The result is 
what Dicker calls "Rowe's reconstruction of Anselm's argument," and what I 
shall call more simply, "Anselm's argument." Second, I wanted to free Anselm's 
argument from reliance on the premise that God exists in the understanding. I 
wanted to free it from this premise because Anselm seems to think that when 
we contemplate the idea of God, somehow God himself exists, if only in the 
understanding. Since many would object to this view, or at least find it mysterious, 
I wanted to free his argument from the claim that God exists in the understanding. 
Now I think I succeeded in freeing it. And the result of my effort is nicely laid 
out by Professor Dicker in his paper, the argument that begins with la, 2, 3a, 
and so on. Now of course there is a problem about freeing Anselm's argument 
from reliance on the premise that God exists in the understanding. For that 
premise is vital to Anselm's argument, without it his argument is invalid. If we 
are quite literal, therefore, about what Anselm's argument is, what we must say 
is not that we have freed his argument from reliance on that premise, but that 
we have produced an argument much like his except that it does not contain nor 
require any premise to the effect that God exists in the understanding. Being 
quite literal about it, we should not call the argument we have thus produced, 
"Anselm's argument." Instead I shall now call it "Son of Anselm's argument." 
Now note two things about the Son of Anselm's argument. First, it nowhere 
relies on the claim that God exists in the understanding. Second, it is a valid 
argument for God's existence, given that 9a (If X is a possible thing, then X is 
either an existing thing or a nonexisting thing) is a necessary truth or simply 
included as a premise. It is this argument (the Son of Anselm's argument) that 
I sought to refute by claiming that it begs the question. And it is clear, I believe, 
that Dicker does not challenge my attempt to so refute the Son of Anselm's 
argument. What then is the problem? Well, the problem is that unless we agree 
to replace Anselm's argument with the Son of Anselm's argument, it still remains 
to be seen whether the objection to the Son of Anselm's argument works against 
Anselm's argument. And I must confess that I did not deal with this problem 
in my essay. I assumed, if you like, that everyone would be willing to substitute the 
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Son of Anselm's argument for Anselm's argument. Dicker, however, is unwil-
ling. For his position is that Anselm's argument does not faIl prey to the objection 
of question-begging I advanced against the Son of Anselm's argument. Against 
Dicker, however, I shaIl argue that Anselm's argument does fall prey to the 
objection of question-begging I advanced against the Son of Anselm's argument. 
Anselm's argument, like the Son of Anselm's argument, contains the premise 
that God could exist in reality, the premise I took to imply that God has the 
status of a possible object. I argued (in effect) that the Son of Anselm's argument 
is question-begging by reason of including this premise. What then of Anselm's 
argument? Here Dicker suggests that for Anselm's argument we can interpret 
the premise in question not as the claim that God is a possible being, but as the 
claim that the assertion that God exists is not self-contradictory, thereby escaping 
my objection. Of course, once this is done, my objection against the premise 
that God could exist in reality no longer applies. For I had interpreted that 
premise differently. But we now must look criticaIly, as Dicker himself does, 
at premise (1) (God exists in the understanding). Given my interpretation of 
premise (2) (God could exist in reality), we can recast the argument so that it 
does not require premise (1). But given Dicker's interpretation of premise (2), 
we cannot avoid placing great weight on premise (1) and, I believe, rendering 
it subject to the very same objection of question-begging that I advanced against 
the premise that God has the status of a possible object. 
Consider the statement form: X exists in the understanding. How are we to 
understand this? I suggest two different interpretations. 
a. someone has an idea of X. 
b. some thing is an X, at least in the understanding. 
On the first interpretation, (a), few will question the truth of the statement that 
results when we replace 'X' with 'God.' The problem comes when we move to 
premise (3). For on Dicker's interpretation of (3), we would then get: 
If someone has an idea of X but no existing thing is X, then if the 
assertion that X exists is not self-contradictory, X could be greater than 
it is. 
The problem is that the final consequent of (3) (X could be greater than it is) 
makes no sense unless X has some status as a being. And if all we begin with 
is that someone has an idea of X, we have not so far accorded X any status in 
virtue of which we can claim that X itself could be greater. And premise (2) 
will be no help at all on Dicker's interpretation since all it does is claim that a 
certain statement is not self-contradictory. The result is that if we so interpret 
premise (1) that it expresses a proposition that would be easily accepted, premise 
(3) becomes unacceptable. On the other hand, if we interpret premise (1) in 
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terms of (b), as asserting that some thing is an X, at least in the understanding, 
we purchase the acceptability of (3) at the price of making (1) (God exists in 
the understanding) subject to the objection of question-begging that I brought 
against the Son of Anselm's argument. For on Anselm's view, things that exist 
in the understanding are exhaustively divided into (c) those things that exist in 
the understanding and also exist in reality, and (d) those things that exist in the 
understanding but do not also exist in reality. Suppose that no magicians exist 
in the actual world. Consider the concept of a magican, an actually existing 
magician. This is a coherent concept. We have an idea of a magican. But does 
a magican exist in the understanding? If it does then that object that is a magican 
falls into class (c) or class (d)-either it exists in reality as welI or it exists only 
in the understanding. Now a magican cannot exist only in the understanding-a 
magician can exist only in the understanding, but not a magican. So a magican 
that exists in the understanding does not fall into class (d). Does such a magican 
therefore falI into class (c)? On the supposition that there are no magicians in 
existence, the answer is no. We have, therefore, a clear idea of a magican, but, 
on the assumption that no magicians exist, no magican exists in the understanding. 
What folIows is that we can have coherent ideas of things such that those things 
do not exist in the understanding. 
Now once we understand Anselm's concept of God and his principle that 
existence in reality makes for greatness in a being it becomes clear that God, 
so conceived, cannot exist in the understanding and fall into class (d). If God 
does exist in the understanding, therefore, he must falI into class (c), he must 
exist in reality as well. But how can we be sure that God does exist in the 
understanding? We have already seen that we may have a coherent idea of an 
X without it being true that an X exists in the understanding. So the mere fact 
that we have a coherent idea of God does not enable us to know that God does 
in fact exist in the understanding. How then are we to know whether or not 
Anselm's God does or does not exist in the understanding? In fact, Anselm's 
God exists in the understanding if and only if He exists in reality. My suggestion 
is that we in fact can be sure that Anselm's premise (God exists in the understand-
ing) is true only if we are sure that Anselm's God exists in reality. In short, 
Anselm's argument, no less than the Son of Anselm's argument, begs the ques-
tion. For our knowledge of one of its crucial premises is in fact dependent on 
our knowledge of the truth of its conclusion. 
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